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A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty
Abstract
This paper extends the theory of investment under uncertainty to incorporate fixed costs of investment, a
wedge between the purchase price and sale price of capital, and potential irreversibility of investment. In this
extended framework, investment is a non-decreasing function of q, the shadow price of installed capital. There
are potentially three investment regimes, which depend on the value of q relative to two critical values. For
values of q above the upper critical value, investment is positive and is an increasing function of q, as is
standard in the theory branch of the adjustment cost literature. For intermediate values of q, between two
critical values, investment is zero. Although this regime features prominently in the irreversibility literature, it
is largely ignored in the adjustment cost literature. Finally, if q is below the lower critical value, gross
investment is negative, a possibility that is ruled out by assumption in the irreversibility of literature. In
general, however, the shadow price q is not directly observable, so we present two examples relating q to
observable varieties.
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 A Unified Model of Investment Under Uncertainty
 By ANDREW B. ABEL AND JANICE C. EBERLY *
 This paper extends the theory of investment under uncertainty to incorporate
 fixed costs of investment, a wedge between the purchase price and sale price of
 capital, and potential irreversibility of investment. In this extended framework,
 investment is a nondecreasing function of q, the shadow price of installed
 capital. The optimal rate of investment is in one of three regimes (positive, zero,
 or negative gross investment), depending on the value of q relative to two critical
 values. In general however, the shadow price q is not directly observable, so we
 present two examples relating q to observable variables. (JEL E22)
 If a firm can instantaneously and cost-
 lessly adjust its capital stock, then, as shown
 by Dale W. Jorgenson (1963), its decision
 about how much capital to use is essentially
 a static decision in which the marginal prod-
 uct of capital is equated to the user cost of
 capital. The firm's investment decision be-
 comes an interesting dynamic problem, in
 which anticipations about the future eco-
 nomic environment affect current invest-
 ment, when frictions prevent instantaneous
 and costless adjustment of the capital stock.
 The investment literature of the last three
 decades has focused on two types of fric-
 tions: adjustment costs and irreversibility.
 In this paper, we present a simple, more
 general framework that encompasses irre-
 versibility as well as adjustment costs that
 may include a fixed component. Within
 this more general framework, the opti-
 mal investment behavior of the firm poten-
 tially comprises three regimes: (i) a regime
 of positive gross investment; (ii) a regime of
 zero gross investment; and (iii) a regime of
 negative gross investment. Most of the
 adjustment-cost literature tends to focus,
 either implicitly or explicitly, on the first of
 these regimes. The irreversibility literature
 is more explicit in its recognition of regimes
 of positive gross investment and zero gross
 investment, and it rules out the regime of
 negative gross investment by assumption.
 The more general model presented here
 allows a simple characterization of the con-
 ditions giving rise to each of these regimes.
 In the adjustment-cost literature, based
 on the seminal work of Robert Eisner and
 Robert H. Strotz (1963), the adjustment-cost
 function is typically assumed to be strictly
 convex and to have a value of zero at zero
 investment. Although a few studies mention
 the possibility of fixed costs (see Michael
 Rothschild, 1971; Stephen J. Nickell, 1978),
 there is virtually no formal analysis of these
 fixed costs. The model presented in this
 paper incorporates fixed costs.
 During the 1970's and 1980's, the adjust-
 ment-cost literature began to merge with
 the literature on Tobin's q. James Tobin
 (1969) argued that the optimal rate of in-
 vestment is an increasing function of the
 ratio of the market value of the firm to the
 replacement cost of the firm's capital-a
 ratio that he called q and that has come to
 be known as "average q." Michael Mussa
 (1977) showed in a deterministic model, and
 * Department of Finance, The Wharton School of
 the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA
 19104-6367. The authors thank Avner Bar-Ilan, William
 Brainard, James Foster, Michel Habib, and partici-
 pants in seminars at the University of Pennsylvania,
 Cotumbia University, Johns Hopkins University, New
 York University, North Carolina State University,
 Princeton University, Rice University, Texas A&M
 University, the University of British Columbia, the
 University of Chicago, the University of Maryland, the
 University of Quebec at Montreal, the University of
 South Florida, the University of Texas, the University
 of Washington, Vanderbilt University, and Yale Uni-
 versity for their comments. Financial support from the
 National Science Foundation and the Wharton Junior
 Faculty Research Fund is gratefully acknowledged.
 1369
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:44:00 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1370 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 1994
 Abel (1983) showed in a stochastic model,
 that the optimal rate of investment is the
 rate that equates the marginal adjustment
 cost with the marginal value of installed
 capital, a concept known as "marginal q."
 While average q is a potentially observable
 number, it is marginal q that is relevant for
 investment decisions. Fumio Hayashi (1982)
 presented conditions under which average q
 and marginal q are equal.
 As indicated earlier, the assumption that
 investment is irreversible is another type of
 friction that makes the investment decision
 an interesting dynamic problem. In a semi-
 nal paper on irreversibility, Kenneth J.
 Arrow (1968 pp. 8-9) argued that "there
 will be many situations in which the sale
 of capital goods cannot be accomplished at
 the same price as their purchase.... For
 simplicity, we will make the extreme
 assumption that resale of capital goods is
 impossible, so that gross investment is
 constrained to be non-negative." Arrow
 showed that, in a deterministic model, opti-
 mal investment behavior under irreversibil-
 ity will be characterized by alternating inter-
 vals of time corresponding to regimes of
 positive gross investment and regimes of
 zero gross investment. When the shadow
 price of capital is smaller than the cost of
 new capital, the firm will have zero invest-
 ment; when the firm undertakes positive
 gross investment, the shadow price of capi-
 tal equals the cost of new capital.'
 We incorporate both adjustment costs
 and irreversibility in an extended model
 of adjustment costs. We note that ad-
 justment costs and irreversibility are ex-
 amined together in a deterministic mo-
 del by Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1981) and
 in a stochastic model by Lucas and Edward
 C. Prescott (1971). Curiously, both of these
 papers introduce the constraint that gross
 investment is nonnegative in the formal op-
 timization problem, yet neither paper com-
 ments on this assumption, nor does either
 paper use the term "irreversibility." In ef-
 fect, these papers take as a postulate that
 gross investment cannot be negative. In con-
 trast, our model incorporates Arrow's ob-
 servation that the resale price of capital
 may be below the price of new capital, and
 the model includes the special case in which
 the resale price is zero.
 If we were simply to postulate that gross
 investment cannot be negative, then it would
 be easy to impose irreversibility in an
 adjustment-cost framework by simply as-
 suming that infinite adjustment costs are
 incurred at any negative rate of investment,
 as in Caballero (1991 p. 281). Our approach
 avoids treating irreversibility as a postulate
 but rather allows for (and characterizes)
 cases in which the optimal rate of invest-
 ment by the firm is never negative. We
 introduce an augmented adjustment-cost
 function that includes traditional convex ad-
 justment costs, as well as the possibility of
 fixed costs and the possibility that the resale
 price of capital goods is below their pur-
 chase price and may even be zero. In this
 augmented adjustment-cost framework, in-
 vestment is a nondecreasing function of the
 shadow price q, which is always positive.
 There are three regimes of optimal invest-
 ment behavior characterized by two critical
 values of q, q1 < q2. Optimal gross invest-
 ment is positive for q > q2, zero for values
 of q between q1 and q2, and negative for
 q <q1. If the lower critical value, q1, is
 negative, then negative gross investment is
 never optimal, and investment would ap-
 pear to be irreversible to an outside ob-
 server. It is worth noting that irreversibility
 does not require infinite adjustment costs at
 negative rates of gross investment, as as-
 sumed by Caballero (1991); indeed, as long
 as the augmented adjustment cost is strictly
 positive for all negative rates of gross invest-
 ment, optimal investment behavior will ap-
 pear to be irreversible.
 1The same relationship among gross investment, the
 shadow price of capital, and the price of new capital
 was derived in a stochastic general-equilibrium model
 by Thomas J. Sargent (1980). Similarly, Giuseppe
 Bertola and Ricardo Caballero (1994) examine the
 behavior of an individual firm under uncertainty and
 find that the firm equates the marginal product of
 capital and the user cost of capital whenever it is
 undertaking gross investment; when the firm is not
 investing, the marginal product of capital is below the
 user cost.
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 In Section I we introduce the augmented
 adjustment-cost function and relate optimal
 investment to the shadow price q. Section II
 relates the shadow price q to observable
 variables in the context of two examples
 that restrict attention to the investment be-
 havior of a competitive firm. Section III
 discusses the implications of competitive
 equilibrium for our analysis of these exam-
 ples. Section IV summarizes and outlines
 future work.
 I. The Model of the Firm
 A. The Operating-Profit and Augmented
 Adjustment-Cost Functions
 Consider a firm that uses capital and a
 vector of costlessly adjustable inputs, such
 as labor, to produce a nonstorable output.
 At each point of time, the firm chooses the
 amounts of costlessly adjustable inputs to
 maximize the value of its revenue minus
 expenditures on these inputs. Let r(Kt,, E)
 denote the maximized value of this instanta-
 neous operating profit at time t, where Kt
 is the capital stock at time t and Et is
 a random variable that could represent
 randomness in technology, in the prices of
 costlessly adjustable inputs, or in the de-
 mand facing the firm. Assume that
 7K(Kt, et)> 0, 7rKK(Kt, et) 0 ,2 and that
 Et evolves according to a diffusion process:
 (1) det = (Et) dt + (Et) dz
 where z is a standard Wiener process.
 Capital is acquired by undertaking gross
 investment at rate I, and the capital stock
 depreciates at a fixed proportional rate 8,
 so the capital stock evolves according to
 (2) dKt = (It - Mtdt.
 When the firm undertakes gross invest-
 ment, it incurs costs that we can describe in
 terms of three components: (i) purchase or
 sale costs, (ii) costs of adjustment, and (iii)
 fixed costs per unit time.
 (i) Purchase/sale costs are the costs of
 buying or selling uninstalled capital. Let pjK
 be the price per unit at which the firm can
 buy any amount of uninstalled capital, and
 let pK be the price per unit at which the
 firm can sell any amount of uninstalled cap-
 ital. We assume that pK' > pK- ? 0. The sale
 price of capital may be strictly less than the
 purchase price of capital if, for example,
 capital is firm-specific.3'4
 The purchase/sale cost function is pKI
 for I > 0 and PK I for I < 0. It is a (weakly)
 convex and nondecreasing function that
 takes the value zero when gross investment
 is zero. Note that the purchase/sale cost
 function is twice differentiable everywhere
 except possibly at I = 0.
 (ii) Adjustment costs are nonnegative
 costs that attain their minimum value of
 zero when I = 0. As is typical in the adjust-
 ment-cost literature, we assume that adjust-
 ment costs are continuous and strictly con-
 vex in J.5,6
 In some formulations, adjustment costs
 also depend on the capital stock K, with the
 2This formulation of the profit function allows the
 firm to be either a price-taker or a price-setter. In the
 examples in Section II, the firm is assumed to be a
 price taker.
 3Alternatively, the sale of capital may be less than its
 purchase price if there is adverse selection in the
 market for used capital goods. The adverse-selection
 framework, however, implies heterogeneity in acquisi-
 tion and sales prices across firms.
 4In addition to Arrow (1968) cited in the Introduc-
 tion, Nickell (1978 p. 40), Bertola and Caballero (1991
 p. 1), and Robert S. Pindyck (1991 p. 1111) recognize
 that pK- may be lower than pK' and choose to make
 the extreme assumption that pK = 0. In the literature
 on consumer durables, Pok-sang Lam (1989), Sanford
 J. Grossman and Guy Laroque (1990), and Eberly
 (1994) include a proportional transaction cost when
 consumers resell durables, which corresponds to p-K
 being smaller than pK.
 Notable exceptions are Alan S. Manne (1961) and
 Rothschild (1971), who analyze investment behavior
 under concave adjustment costs.
 6In addition, the partial derivative of the adjust-
 ment-cost function with respect to investment goes to
 infinity as investment goes to infinity, and this partial
 derivative goes to negative infinity as investment goes
 to negative infinity.
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 partial derivative of the adjustment-cost
 function with respect to K being negative.7
 To accommodate this case as well as the
 case in which adjustment costs do not de-
 pend on K, we assume that the partial
 derivative of the adjustment-cost function
 with respect to K is nonpositive.
 We assume that the adjustment-cost func-
 tion is twice differentiable with respect
 to I everywhere except possibly at I= 0.
 The assumptions made so far imply that
 the partial derivative of the adjustment-
 cost function with respect to investment is
 positive for I > 0 and is negative for I < 0.
 If the adjustment-cost function is differenti-
 able at I = 0, the partial derivative of the
 adjustment-cost function is zero at I = 0;
 more generally, the left-hand partial deriva-
 tive is nonpositive and the right-hand
 derivative is nonnegative at I= 0.
 (iii) Fixed costs of investment are nonneg-
 ative costs that are independent of the level
 of investment and are incurred at each point
 in time when investment is nonzero. Thus, a
 firm can avoid the fixed cost of investment
 at a particular point of time by setting in-
 vestment equal to zero at that point of time.
 We take account of all three of these
 types of costs associated with capital invest-
 ment. The total cost of investment equals
 the product of a dummy variable v and
 an "augmented adjustment-cost function"
 c(I,K). The dummy variable v takes the
 value 0 when I = 0 so that the total invest-
 ment cost is zero when I = 0. When I o 0,
 the dummy variable v equals 1 so that the
 total investment cost equals the augmented
 adjustment cost c(I, K).
 The augmented adjustment-cost function
 c(I, K) represents the sum of purchase/sale
 costs, adjustment costs, and fixed costs. We
 assume that lim, I 0 c(I, K) = lim1 t 0 c(I, K)
 and denote the common value of these
 limits as c(0, K). Note that c(0, K) is not
 the total investment cost when I = 0, be-
 cause when I = 0 the dummy variable v eq-
 uals 0 and total investment cost equals
 zero. Instead, c(O, K) is interpreted as the
 fixed cost of investment because both
 the purchase/sale cost function and the
 adjustment-cost function are continuous
 functions that take on the value 0 when
 I = 0. Because the fixed cost is nonnegative,
 we have c(O, K) ? 0. The augmented adjust-
 ment-cost function is continuous, strictly
 convex, and twice differentiable with re-
 spect to I everywhere except possibly at
 I = 0.8 Let c1(O, K)- and c1(O, K)+ denote
 the left-hand and right-hand partial deriva-
 tives, respectively, of c(I, K) with respect to
 I evaluated at I= 0. It follows from the
 assumptions made above that c1(O, K)Y 2 0,
 but c1(O, K)- may be positive, negative, or
 zero. In addition, c(O, K)+ > c(0, K)Y.
 B. Maximization: The
 Optimal-Investment Function
 Assume that the firm is risk-neutral and
 chooses investment to maximize the ex-
 pected present value of operating profit
 7r(K, E) less total investment cost vc(I, K).
 The value of the firm is thus
 (3) V(K,, e,) = max fO Et{w(Kt+s1Et+s)
 - vt+Sc(It+s, Kt+s)}e-rsds
 where r > 0 is the discount rate, and the
 maximization in (3) is subject to the evolu-
 tion of Et and Kt described in (1) and (2),
 respectively.9
 We will solve the maximization problem
 in (3) using the Bellman equationl0 (where
 7For instance, Lucas (1967, 1981), Arthur B.
 Treadway (1969), Lucas and Prescott (1971), Hayashi
 (1982), and Abel and Olivier J. Blanchard (1983) all
 model adjustment costs as a decreasing function of K
 for a given I.
 8The properties noted in footnote 6 imply that
 lim Ic1(I, K) = oo and lim1 , _O:c1(I, K) = - c.
 9While standard, this expression rules out bubbles
 in the value of the firm.
 'OA formal derivation of this Bellman equation is
 presented in Appendix A of Abel and Eberly (1993).
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 we have suppressed the time subscript t):
 (4) rV(K, e)
 =max (1(K, ) - vc(I, K) + ( E(dV)}
 The left-hand side of equation (4) is the
 required return on the firm, and the right-
 hand side of (4) is the maximized expected
 return, which consists of two components:
 operating profits net of augmented adjust-
 ment costs, rr(K, e) - vc(I, K); and the ex-
 pected "capital gain" represented by the
 change in the value of the firm,
 (l/dt)E(dV). To calculate the expected
 capital gain, we observe that the value of
 the firm, V, depends on K and e, which
 evolve continuously over time according to
 (2) and (1), respectively. Thus, we can calcu-
 late E(dV) using Ito's lemma, equations (1)
 and (2), and the facts that (dK)2 = (dKXdE)
 = (dt)2 = (dz)(dt) = 0 = E(dz) to obtain
 (5) E(dV)
 = [VK(I - 8K) + x(E)V0 + 2(8)21jj dt.
 Now define q VK, which is the marginal
 valuation of a unit of installed capital. Sub-
 stituting this definition and the expected
 capital gain from equation (5) into equation
 (4) yields
 (6) rV=max{v(K,8)-vc(I,K)
 + q( I-8K)
 + /(E)V2 + 2(_)2V
 To solve the maximization problem on
 the right-hand side of (6), notice that the
 only terms that involve the decision vari-
 ables I and v are - vc(I, K) and qI. There-
 fore, the optimal values of I and v solve
 (7) max[qI-vc(I,K)].
 I, v
 It is convenient to solve the maximization
 problem in (7) in two steps. First, assume
 that v = 1, and choose the value of I that
 maximizes the maximand in (7) conditional
 on v = 1. Then choose v to be either 0 or 1.
 For the moment, assume that v = 1 and
 let if (q, K) denote the maximized value of
 the maximand in (7) given that v = 1.
 Specifically,
 (8) tf(q,K) max[qI-c(I,K)].
 I
 Let I*(q, K) denote the value of I that
 maximizes the maximand in equation (8).
 Given that c(I, K) is strictly convex in I and
 is differentiable everywhere except possibly
 at I = 0, the first-order conditions determin-
 ing I*(q, K) are:
 (9a) c,(I*(q,K),K) =q
 for q < c(O, K) or q > c(O, K) +
 (9b) I*(q, K) = 0
 for c(O, K) < q < c1(O, K)
 According to equation (9a) the firm equates
 the marginal cost of investment and the
 marginal benefit of investment, measured by
 q. Notice that ci, I > 0 implies that I*(q, K)
 is a strictly increasing function of q over the
 range of q in equation (9a).
 If c(I, K) is differentiable at I = 0, then
 c1(O, K)- = c1(O, K)+ and c1(I*(q, K),K)
 = q for all q. However, if c(I, K) is not
 differentiable at I = 0, then for values of q
 between c(O, K)- and c,(O, K)+ there is
 no corresponding value of the marginal cost
 of investment. As shown in equation (9b)
 for values of q in this range, I*(q, K) = 0.
 Looking at equations (9a) and, (9b) to-
 gether, we see that I*(q, K) is a nonde-
 creasing function over the entire range of q,
 and that
 J< 0 for q < c(O, K)
 (10) I*(q K)) =? for?c(O,K) <q
 > 0 for q > c,(O, K)+.
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 Having determined the optimal value of I
 given that v - 1, we now turn to the choice
 of the optimal value of v. If v = 0, gross
 investment is also zero, and the value of the
 maximand in equation (7) is zero. If v = 1,
 the optimal rate of investment is I*(q, K)
 and the value of the maximand in (8) is
 (11) fr(q, K)
 = qI*(q, K) - c( I*(q, K), K).
 The firm will therefore choose v = 1 when,
 and only when, qi(q, K) is greater than
 zero."1 To determine the sign of ir(q, K),
 we now characterize the behavior of this
 function. Recall from equation (9b) that for
 c,(O, K)- < q < c,(O, K)+, I*(q, K) = 0.
 Substituting zero investment into the right-
 hand side of (11) yields
 (12) qr(q, K) =-c(O, K)
 if c(0, K) < q < c1(O, K)
 For values of q outside the interval
 [c(O, K)-, c1(O, K)]+ , qi(q, K) > - c(O, K)
 because the firm could always choose to set
 I = 0 and thereby attain a value of - c(0, K)
 for qI - c(I, K). Thus, the minimum value
 of i(q, K) is attained for q in the interval
 [c1(O, K)-, c1(O, K)+ ]. Outside this interval,
 i(q, K) is twice differentiable with respect
 to q. Differentiating equation (11) with re-
 spect to q and using equations (9a) and (10)
 \ 00, K) - c(, K) + /
 q, ~~~~~~~~~q2
 -c(O,K) K-
 FIGURE 1. THE REWARD TO INVESTING
 yields
 (13) di1q(q, K)
 <0 if q<c1(O,K)
 I=0 if c1(0,K) q
 <c,(0,K) +
 > 0 if q > c1(O, K) +
 (14) q1qq(q, K) =Iq*(q, K)> O
 if q < c(O, K) or if q > c(O, K)
 Thus, the function qi(q, K) is a convex
 function that attains its minimum value of
 - c(O, K) when q is in the interval
 [c(O, K)-, c(O, K)]+ . Let q1 and q2 denote
 the smallest and largest roots, respectively,
 of qi(q, K) = 0. It follows from equation (13)
 that
 (15) qf(q, K) > 0 if q < q1 or q > q2.
 The function qi(q, K) is depicted in Fig-
 ure 1 for a given value of K. The flat
 segment of qf(q, K) for values of q between
 c1(0, K)- and c1(O, K)+ corresponds to
 equation (12). Figure 1 is drawn under the
 assumption that the fixed cost, c(O, K) is
 positive, so that the minimum value of
 O(q, K) is negative, and the flat segment
 lies below the horizontal axis. According to
 equation (13), qi(q, K) is strictly decreasing
 to the left of the flat segment and strictly
 increasing to the right of the flat segment.
 Thus, in the case depicted in Figure 1, the
 ilWhen fr(q, K) = 0, the firm is indifferent between
 I = 0 and I = I*(q, K). Of course, if I*(q, K) = 0, the
 optimal rate of investment is zero. If I*(q, K) * 0, we
 assume that the firm chooses to set investment equal to
 zero at these points of indifference. The time path of
 K is unaffected by this assumption because q-
 VK(K, e) follows a diffusion process, which implies that
 the set of times when q,(q, K) = 0 and I*(q, K) O 0
 has zero measure.
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 equation if(q, K) = 0 has two distinct roots,
 q1 and q2; qi(q, K)> 0 if q < q1 or if q > q2.
 Thus, optimal investment behavior I(q, K)
 is characterized by
 tI*(q, K) < 0if q<q1
 (16) I(q, K) = if ql<q<q2
 I*(q,K)>0 if q>q2-
 C. Characteristics of Optimal
 Investment and q
 (i) As shown in equation (16), the opti-
 mal rate of investment is zero when q is in
 the interval [ql, q21. We will show that q2 >
 q1, so that this range of inaction for invest-
 ment is nondegenerate, if there are fixed
 costs of investment [c(O, K) > 0] or if the
 augmented adjustment-cost function is non-
 differentiable with respect to I at I = 0.
 In general qf(q, K) = 0 may have either a
 unique root or more than one root. If there
 is more than one root, there are either two
 roots or a continuum of roots. We describe
 each of these three cases below.
 Case I: f(q, K) = 0 has a unique root so that
 q, = q2 and the range of inaction is degen-
 erate. The equation qf(q, K)= 0 has a
 unique root if (a) c(I, K) is differentiable
 at I = 0 so that c1(O, K)- = c1(O, K)+, and
 hence there is no flat segment at the
 bottom of the O(q,K) function; and (b)
 the fixed cost c(O, K) = 0 so that the mini-
 mum value of f(q, K) is zero. These two
 assumptions are fairly standard in the
 adjustment-cost literature, and they ac-
 count for the absence of a range of inac-
 tion in much of this literature (see e.g.,
 John P. Gould, 1968; Richard Hartman,
 1972; Abel and Blanchard, 1983).
 Case II: ifr(q, K) = 0 has exactly two roots so
 that there is a nondegenerate range of inac-
 tion. The equation ifr(q, K)= 0 has ex-
 actly two distinct roots if the fixed cost
 c(O, K) > 0 so that the minimum value of
 f(q, K) is negative. With a positive fixed
 cost of investment, a nondegenerate range
 of inaction will arise regardless of the
 differentiability of c(I, K) at I = 0.
 Case III: fi(q,K)=O has a continuum of
 roots so that there is a nondegenerate range
 of inaction. If (a) the augmented adjust-
 ment-cost function c(I, K) is not differ-
 entiable at I = 0 so that c1(0, K)- <
 c1(O, K)+ [implying that there is a flat
 segment at the bottom of f(q, K)] and
 (b) the fixed cost c(0, K) = 0, so that the
 flat segment at the bottom of ifl(q, K) lies
 along the horizontal axis, then i(q, K) = 0
 has a continuum of roots extending from
 q, to q2. For any value of q in this range,
 the optimal rate of investment is zero.
 (ii) The largest and smallest roots of the
 equation qi(q, K) = 0, q, and q2, depend
 only on the specification of the augmented
 adjustment-cost function c(I, K). They are
 independent of the specification of the
 operating-profit function 7(K, E) and the
 specification of the diffusion process for Et.
 (iii) If there are positive fixed costs or if
 c(I, K) is not differentiable at I = 0, there is
 a nondegenerate range of inaction. If there
 are positive fixed costs, the function I(q, K)
 is discontinuous; the optimal rate of invest-
 ment jumps from a negative value to zero at
 q = ql, and it jumps from zero to a positive
 value at q = q2.
 (iv) If min, c(I, K) 2 0, it is never opti-
 mal for the firm to undertake negative gross
 investment; the firm's behavior is observa-
 tionally equivalent to a situation of irre-
 versible investment.12 Note from the defini-
 tion of qi(q, K) in equation (8) that qi(0, K)
 = max, - c(I, K) = - min, c(I, K) so that if
 min c(I, K) 2 0, then qi(0, K) < 0. But if
 qf(0, K) < 0, then q,, the smallest root of
 tf(q, K) = 0, is nonpositive. Therefore it is
 impossible for q, which must be positive
 [see equation (20)], to be less than q1, and
 12Caballero (1991 p. 281) specifies the augmented
 adjustment-cost function C(I) = I + [I > 0],1IP + [I <
 0]721I P where 8 ? 1, Y I 0,72? 0, and the brackets
 denote the indicator function. Caballero states that
 "the irreversible-investment case of Pindyck (1988) and
 Bertola (1988) corresponds to the case in which ym = 0,
 Y2 = , and 3 = 1." In fact, however, if 3 = 1, irre-
 versibility will occur whenever Y2 > 1. There is no need
 to make Y2 infinite to prevent optimal investment from
 being negative.
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 the optimal rate of investment cannot be
 negative.13 This result has a straightforward
 explanation. In order for a firm to find it
 optimal to give up some of its installed
 capital, which has a positive value, the aug-
 mented adjustment cost it incurs must be
 negative (i.e., the net sale price of the capi-
 tal after taking account of the fixed cost and
 the adjustment cost must be positive). If
 there is no value of gross investment for
 which c(I, K) is negative, then it will never
 be optimal for a firm to undertake negative
 gross investment.
 (v) Note that the Bellman equation in
 equation (6) holds identically in K at a
 point in time so the partial derivative of the
 left-hand side with respect to K equals the
 partial derivative of the right-hand side with
 respect to K. Differentiating both sides of
 (6) with respect to K yields
 (17) rVK= VK(K,E) -CK(1, K)
 -q + qK( I - 5K)
 + A(?)Ve,K + 2 K
 A
 where I is optimal investment from equa-
 tion (16) and v is the optimal choice of v.
 Recall that q VK so that q =Ve,K and
 qe,e = Ve,e,K. Now apply Ito's lemma and
 equations (1) and (2) to calculate E{dq}:
 (18) E{dq} = qK(I -K) dt
 + AW(K)I, K dt + ,o( )2I ,eK dt.
 Substituting (18) into (17) and rearranging
 yields
 (19) (r?+)q
 E{dq}
 =7IK(K,e)-VCK(I,K) + dt
 Equation (19) is essentially an Euler equa-
 tion from the calculus of variations. The
 left-hand side of equation (19) is the re-
 quired return (gross return before subtract-
 ing depreciation) on the valuation of the
 marginal unit of capital, and the right-hand
 side is the expected return, which consists
 of three components: the marginal oper-
 ating profit 7nK(K, c), the marginal reduc-
 tion in the augmented adjustment cost
 - VCK(I, K), and the expected capital gain
 E{dq}/dt. In the special case in which there
 is no uncertainty, equation (19) becomes
 (r + 8)q = 7K(K, E) - vCK(I, K) + dq/dt,
 which is widely used in the deterministic
 literature on the q theory of investment
 (see e.g., Blanchard and Stanley Fishcher,
 1989 p. 62).
 (vi) The marginal valuation of installed
 capital, q, is the expected present value of
 the stream of marginal products of capital.
 This result can be shown formally using the
 following lemma, which is a special case of
 the Feynman-Kac formula (see loannis
 Karatzas and Steven E. Shreve, 1988 p. 267).
 A simple proof is given in appendix B of
 Abel and Eberly (1993).
 LEMMA 1: Suppose that Xt is a diffusion
 and that a> 0 is constant. Then Xt =
 Et{fOgt,e a'ds) is a solution to the differ-
 ential equation Et(dx)/dt - aVt + gt = 0.
 Using the fact that qt is a diffusion and
 applying this lemma to equation (19)
 yields'4
 00
 (20) qt =fEt{rK ( Kt +s, Et +s)
 - Vt+scK( It+s, Kt+S)le-(r+)s ds
 >0.
 13To show that q2, the largest root of /(q, K) = 0, is
 not negative, we suppose that q2 < 0 and show that this
 assumption leads to a contradiction. If q2 <O, then
 according to equation (16), I(O, K) = I*(0, K) > 0. Re-
 call that c1(0, K)+ > 0 so that equation (10) implies
 that I*(O, K) < 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore
 q2 ? 0.
 14We have chosen the solution to equation (19) that
 does not contain bubbles.
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 Thus, qt is the present value of the stream
 of expected marginal profit of capital which
 consists of two components: rK(K, 8) is the
 marginal operating profit accruing to capi-
 tal, and - vcK(I, K) is the reduction in
 the augmented adjustment cost accruing to
 the marginal unit of capital. The assump-
 tions made above that 7K(K, 8) > 0 and
 CK(I, K) ? 0 imply that qt is always positive.
 II. Relating the Shadow Price q to
 Observable Variables
 We have shown that optimal investment
 is a nondecreasing function of the shadow
 price of capital, which is called q. In gen-
 eral, we cannot directly observe shadow
 prices. In this section we restrict our atten-
 tion to perfectly competitive firms with lin-
 early homogeneous production functions
 and derive expressions for q in terms of
 observable variables. In the first example, q
 equals the value of the firm divided by its
 capital stock (Tobin's q), and in the second
 example q is a function of the price of
 output, the real interest rate, and parame-
 ters describing the price of output and the
 production function.
 Consider a competitive firm that uses cap-
 ital, K, and a vector of costlessly adjustable
 inputs, L, to produce output according to
 the production function F(K, L, ). Assume
 that the production function F(K, L, ) is
 linearly homogeneous in K and L, and note
 that the production function may be subject
 to stochastic shocks. In addition, the com-
 petitive prices of output and inputs may be
 subject to stochastic shocks. It is well known
 that if the firm is a price-taker in output
 and factor markets, the operating profit can
 be written as
 (21) T(K,E) = H(E)K
 where H(E) > O."
 Case I: c(I, K) is linearly homogenous in I
 and K.-We can show that if the operating
 profit function satisfies equation (21), and if
 c(I, K) is linearly homogeneous in I and K,
 then
 (22) V(K, ) =q() K.
 In this case, the shadow price of capital,
 q(E), equals the average value of capital,
 V(K,E)/K, which is observable using secu-
 rity market prices and is known as Tobin's
 q. This result extends Hayashi's (1982) re-
 sult, which was derived in a deterministic
 model, to a stochastic model that admits
 irreversibility.
 The value function in equation (22) is
 implied by the following lemma, proved in
 Appendix A.
 LEMMA 2: Suppose that wr(K, e) and
 c(I, K) are homogeneous of degree p in
 I and K. Then the value function can be
 written as V(K, e) = A(E)KP, and q
 VK(K, e) = p V(K, 1)/K.
 Thus, when the operating profit function
 and the augmented adjustment-cost func-
 tion are of the same degree of homogeneity,
 marginal q and average q are proportional.
 In the special case where p = 1 [so that
 equation (21) holds, and the augmented
 adjustment-cost function is linearly homoge-
 neous], Lemma 2 indicates that average and
 marginal q are equal, as in equation (22).
 We now discuss the content of the as-
 sumption that c(I,K) is linearly homoge-
 neous. Recall that c(I,K) has three com-
 ponents: (i) a purchase/sale cost; (ii) an
 adjustment cost; and (iii) a fixed cost.
 (i) As we discussed in Section I, the pur-
 chase/sale cost is pK I for I> 0 and
 PK-I for I < 0. Obviously, a doubling of
 15The operating profit in this case can be written as
 v(K, e) = maxL[p(E, Q)F(K, L, E) - w(e)'L], where
 p(e, Q) is the given price of the firm's output, w(E) is
 the vector of given prices of the costlessly adjustable
 inputs, and Q is industry output. Note that all of the
 prices may be potentially random. Let A - L/K
 be the vector of ratios of the costlessly adjust-
 able inputs to the capital stock. It follows from the
 linear homogeneity of F(K, L, E) that 7r(K, E) =
 maxx[p(e, Q)F(1, A, e) - w(E)'A]K. The maximand in
 square brackets is independent of the individual firm's
 capital stock, K, and thus the operating-profit function
 can be written as in equation (21), where H(E) =
 max[ p(E, Q)F(1, A, E)-W(E)'X]-
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 I and K doubles the purchase/sale
 cost, so the purchase/sale cost func-
 tion is a linearly homogeneous function
 of I and K.
 (ii) In the literature in which the adjust-
 ment-cost function depends on K as
 well as on I, it is commonly assumed
 that the adjustment-cost function is lin-
 early homogeneous in I and K.16
 (iii) The fixed cost of investment, c(O, K), is
 independent of the amount of invest-
 ment I. If this fixed cost reflects the
 cost of stopping production while new
 capital is installed,'7 it is proportional
 to the operating profit function H(E)K
 which is, of course, proportional to K.
 In this case, the fixed cost, c(O, K), is a
 linearly homogeneous function of I and
 K (even though it is independent of I).
 If the purchase/sale cost, the adjustment
 cost, and fixed cost are all linearly homoge-
 neous functions of I and K, then c(I, K) is
 linearly homogeneous in I and K and can
 be written as
 (23) C(I, K) K- K K1) KG(K
 where G(H) is continuous and convex, and
 except possibly at zero, is twice differen-
 tiable. In this case, c(I, K) = G'(I/K), so
 that equations (16) and (9a) yield
 G (G (q)<O if q<q1
 (24) -K= 0 if ql<q<q2
 tG l(q) > if q >q2
 Notice that the optimal investment-capital
 ratio depends only on q, and since q is
 independent of the capital stock, the opti-
 mal investment-capital ratio is independent
 of the scale of the firm.18 If q1 < 0, then the
 negative investment regime is never opera-
 tive, and as explained in Section I, invest-
 ment would appear to be irreversible.
 Case II: cK(I, K) O.-Now assume that
 the augmented adjustment-cost function
 does not depend on the capital stock (for-
 mally, CK(I, K) O).19 We continue to as-
 sume that the firm is perfectly competitive
 and has a linearly homogeneous production
 function so that the operating profit func-
 tion is proportional to the capital stock
 [equation (21)]. Under these assumptions,
 we show in Appendix B that the value func-
 tion is a linear function of the capital stock
 regardless of the specification of the diffu-
 sion for e. In particular,
 (25) V(K, e) = q(E) K + J(E)
 where J(E)> 0. To get an explicit expres-
 sion for q(E) in terms of the underlying
 stochastic process, we will focus on particu-
 lar parametric specifications of the operat-
 ing profit function and the diffusion for e. It
 is not necessary to restrict c(I, K) further.
 Consider a competitive firm that uses cap-
 ital and labor to produce output according
 to the Cobb-Douglas production function
 vLaKl-, where 0<a<1, and v>0 is a
 productivity parameter that may be stochas-
 tic. The firm pays a constant wage rate w
 per unit of labor and sells its output at a
 price P that may be stochastic. Define p
 Pu and observe that the instantaneous oper-
 ating profit equals the revenue from selling
 output minus the cost of labor so that
 (26) r(K,p) max[pLaKla - wL] = hp0K
 L
 where h (1- a)a/(1a)w-a/(l-a) > 0 and
 0 1/(1 - a)> 1.
 16Lucas (1967,1981), Lucas and Prescott (1971),
 Hayashi (1982) and Abel and Blanchard (1983) all
 make this assumption.
 17Rothschild (1971 p. 609) and Nickell (1978 p. 37)
 both suggest that the cost of stopping production would
 rise to a fixed cost of investment. In addition
 Rothschild suggests that breaking in new equipment or
 procedures is costly.
 18Lucas (1967) highlights this feature in a determin-
 istic model with a linearly homogeneous operating
 profit function and convex costs of adjustment.
 19This assumption is adopted by Eisner and Strotz
 (1963), Gould (1968), Rothschild (1971), Richard
 Hartman (1972), Mussa (1977), Nickell (1978), Pindyck
 (1982), Abel (1983), and Cabellero (1991).
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 At time t, the present value of marginal
 profits accruing to the undepreciated por-
 tion of currently installed capital is20
 00
 (27) qt = h Et P+s)e-(r+6)sds.
 We calculate the expectations in equation
 (27), and the value of qt, under the assump-
 tion that p evolves according to the geomet-
 ric Brownian motion
 dp
 (28) -= adz
 P
 where z follows a standard Wiener process.
 In this case, the distribution of ln pt+ con-
 ditional on pt is N(ln pt - 1(o2S, o-2s) so that
 (29) Et{P+s) = P" exp[ 2(-1)O2s
 Substituting equation (29) into equation (27)
 and simplifying yields21
 hp 0
 (30) qt= [r?8N-6(6_1)T 2]
 Now suppose that 0 < q1 < q2 so that all
 three investment regimes are potentially op-
 erative, 22 and consider the effects of an
 increase in the instantaneous standard devi-
 ation U.23 It follows directly from equation
 (30) that an increase in a increases qt for a
 given pt. If the initial value of q, is less
 than q1 or greater than or equal to q2, the
 increase in q, increases investment, which is
 consistent with Hartman (1972), Abel (1983),
 and Caballero (1991). But note that if the
 initial value of q, is in the interval [q1, q2), a
 small increase in oa will not move q, out of
 this interval, and investment will remain
 unchanged and equal to zero. Thus, with
 the more general adjustment-cost function
 introduced in this paper, we have the result
 that investment is a nondecreasing function
 of a- for a given p,
 III. Competitive Equilibrium24
 In a recent paper Pindyck (1993) ques-
 tions the relevance of adjustment costs in
 competitive equilibrium for firms with con-
 stant returns to scale. Pindyck also points
 out that considerations of industry equilib-
 rium may reverse the findings of Hartman
 (1972), Abel (1983), and Caballero (1991)
 concerning the effects of uncertainty on in-
 vestment by competitive firms.
 We first address Pindyck's argument that
 adjustment costs are irrelevant in a per-
 fectly competitive industry in which firms
 have constant returns to scale. His argu-
 ment applies to the case in which the
 adjustment-cost function depends only on
 the rate of investment, and not on the capi-
 tal stock (see Pindyck, 1993 p. 274). Observe
 from equation (25) that, under constant re-
 turns to scale and this form of the
 adjustment-cost function, the value of a
 competitive firm with capital stock K* is
 q(E)K* + JAE). If this firm could costlessly
 divide itself into two firms with capital stock
 K*/2, each of the two firms would be worth
 q(E)K*/2+ JAE); the total value of the two
 firms would be q(E)K* + 2J(E), which is
 greater than the value of the original firm.
 Thus, provided that new firms can be freely
 created, firms would have an incentive to
 2OAs in equation (20), we assume that there is no
 bubble in the shadow price q.
 21We assume that r + 8 - 10(o - 1)_2> 0 so that
 the integral in equation (27) converges.
 22 Recall that mm1 c(I, K) < 0 is necessary and suf-
 ficient for q1 > 0. Either c(0, K) > 0 or c1(0, K)- <
 c1(O, K) + is sufficient for q2 > q1.
 23When we consider the effects of a change in a
 parameter such as o-, we are actually comparing the
 behavior of two otherwise identical firms with different
 constant values of the parameter in question. This
 analysis does not apply to the effect on a given firm of
 a change in the parameter because the firm's optimiza-
 tion problem assumes that the parameters are known
 with certainty to be constant over time.
 24We thank an anonymous referee for raising the
 issues that motivated us to write this section.
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 divide into smaller parts. In addition, if
 there is free entry, potential entrants would
 enter the industry because even with no
 capital a firm has a positive value JAE).
 Pindyck argues that "in the limit, the indus-
 try would be composed of an infinite num-
 ber of infinitesimally small firms, and so
 each firm would have no adjustment costs"
 (p. 274) because they would each have in-
 finitesimally small rates of investment.
 Pindyck's conclusion that each firm would
 have no adjustment cost is based on the
 assumption that lim1 0 c*(I, K) = 0 and
 lim 0 c (I, K) = 0, where c*(I, K) is the
 adjustment-cost function, rather than the
 augmented adjustment-cost function. While
 this assumption is fairly standard in formu-
 lations of the adjustment-cost function in
 which CK is identically zero, adjustment
 costs will not become irrelevant in our Case
 I, in which the augmented adjustment-cost
 function is linearly homogeneous in I and
 K. As we have shown, the value of the firm
 is strictly proportional to its capital stock in
 this case. Therefore, a firm with zero capital
 has zero value, so that even with free entry
 there are no rents to be earned by potential
 entrants with zero capital. In this case, the
 size distribution of firms is indeterminate. It
 is possible that some firms will have in-
 finitesimally small capital stocks and rates
 of investment, but even for these firms ad-
 justment costs are not irrelevant. Arbitrarily
 small firms will have arbitrarily small values
 of I and K, but the value of I/K will still
 be given by equation (24), which depends on
 the augmented adjustment-cost function.25
 Thus, Pindyck's (1993) argument about the
 irrelevance of adjustment costs under con-
 stant returns to scale and perfect competi-
 tion does not apply when the augmented
 adjustment-cost function is linearly homoge-
 neous in I and K, as in our Case I.
 Pindyck's second argument is that, even if
 for some reason firms cannot be arbitrarily
 small, the response of existing firms and
 free entry will cause the equilibrium price
 to respond endogenously to shocks. Most
 studies of investment behavior by competi-
 tive firms under uncertainty ignore this en-
 dogenous response of equilibrium price. Al-
 though a competitive firm is a price-taker, a
 competitive industry is not a price-taker.
 Specifically, a shock that hits all firms in an
 industry is likely to affect industry output
 and thus the equilibrium price. However, a
 shock that hits only one competitive firm in
 an industry will not affect industry output or
 the equilibrium price.
 Pindyck (1993) analyzes endogenous price
 responses to industry-wide shocks to reex-
 amine the results of Hartman (1972), Abel
 (1983), and Caballero (1991), who find that
 increased uncertainty increases the invest-
 ment of competitive firms with constant re-
 turns to scale. Pindyck shows that if all firms
 in an industry face identical realizations of
 the random variable(s) impacting the indus-
 try, then taking account of the endogenous
 response of the equilibrium price tends to
 reverse the findings of Hartman, Abel, and
 Caballero. However, it should be noted that
 if competitive firms face only idiosyncratic
 shocks, then the results of Hartman, Abel,
 and Caballero continue to hold. Our analy-
 sis in Case II would be subject to Pindyck's
 criticism if we interpret the uncertainty
 about p Pu as arising from demand shocks
 that affect the competitive price of output
 P, which is identical for all firms in a com-
 petitive industry; however, our analysis in
 Case II is immune to Pindyck's criticism if
 the uncertainty arises from a productivity
 shock v that is idiosyncratic to a particular
 firm.26
 25Recall from equation (23) that in this case the
 augmented adjustment-cost function can be written as
 KG(I/K), where G(*) is continuous and convex. Al-
 though the augmented adjustment cost KG(I/K) goes
 to zero as K goes to zero, the marginal augmented
 adjustment cost G'(I/K), evaluated at optimal I, does
 not go to zero as K goes to zero.
 26The issue of the endogenous response of equilib-
 rium price to shocks does not arise in our analysis of
 Case I, because we need not specify the relationship
 between price and the source of uncertainty. Indeed,
 our analysis of Case I did not use any specification for
 the evolution of the price of output. Whatever the
 behavior of the price of output, and however it re-
 sponds to shocks, competitive firms take the price of
 output as given.
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 IV. Conclusion
 In this paper we have extended the ad-
 justment-cost framework under uncertainty
 to incorporate fixed costs of investment, a
 wedge between the purchase price and sale
 price of capital, and potential irreversibility
 of investment. In this extended framework,
 investment is a nondecreasing function of q,
 the shadow price of installed capital, and
 there are potentially three investment
 regimes which depend on the value of q
 relative to the critical values q1 and q2.
 Conveniently, these critical values depend
 only on the specification of the augmented
 adjustment-cost function. If q is greater
 than q2, then, as is standard in the q-theory
 branch of the adjustment-cost literature, in-
 vestment is positive and is an increasing
 function of q. If q is between q1 and q2,
 then the investment is zero. Although this
 regime features prominently in the irre-
 versibility literature, it is largely ignored in
 the adjustment-cost literature. Finally, if q
 is less than ql, gross investment is negative,
 a possibility that is simply ruled out by as-
 sumption in the irreversibility literature.
 The shadow price q is in general not
 observable, so we presented two examples
 relating q to observable variables. In one
 example, restrictions on the production
 function and the augmented adjustment-cost
 function guarantee that q is identically equal
 to the average value of the capital stock,
 which is observable using security prices. In
 the other example, we tightly specify the
 production function and the diffusion pro-
 cess for the random variable p (the product
 of the output price and a productivity pa-
 rameter) and derive an expression for q as a
 function of the contemporaneous value of
 p. In this example, p does not have a sta-
 tionary distribution, and hence q does not
 have a stationary distribution. In ongoing
 research we are examining the behavior of
 q and investment in the presence of a
 mean-reverting process for p so that q will
 have a stationary distribution. The ultimate
 goal of this line of research is to derive an
 econometric specification to apply these
 models to aggregate and disaggregate data
 on investment.
 APPENDIX A
 PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
 The operating-profit function and the
 augmented adjustment-cost function are ho-
 mogeneous of degree p in I and K so that
 (Al) r(K,) = H(E)KP
 and
 (A2) c(I,K)=G ( KP.
 Then the value function in equation (3) can
 be written as
 (A3) V(Kt ,Et)
 I,max Etf[H(Et+s)-v+sG(it+s)]KP s e-rs ds
 where i+S - I+/Kt+s is the (gross) growth
 rate of the capital stock. Consider a firm
 with capital stock K(1) at time t, and let
 I>() and i(l) denote the optimal values
 of the dummy variable v and the
 investment-capital ratio chosen by this firm
 at time t + s. This optimal behavior leads to
 a capital stock of K()S at time t. The value
 of the firm at time t is V(KV1), E). Now
 consider a second firm with a capital stock
 at time t equal to K (2) = aK(') with a > 0.
 This firm has the option of choosing exactiy
 the same values of the dummy variable v
 and the investment-capital ratio I/K at
 every point of time as chosen by the firm
 with capital stock K(l). If the second firm
 were to set = v-(1 ) and 4Th for
 all s > 0, then Kts would equal aKMl for
 all s> 0. Because the cash flow at time
 t + s is proportional to KP+s in equation
 (A3), the second firm has the option of
 obtaining an expected present value of cash
 flows equals to a PV(K ('), t). Therefore,
 (A4) V(ac}Kt, Et ) 2 atPV(Kt, e ) .
 Equation (A4) holds for any Kt and for any
 positive factor a. In particular, consider a
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 first firm that has a capital stock of aKt at
 time t, and a second firm that has a capital
 stock of Kt = (1/a)aKt at time t. There-
 fore, the argument preceding equations (A4)
 implies that
 (AS) V(Kt,Et) 2(1/a) OV(aKt,Et).
 Putting together equations (A4) and (AS)
 we have V(aKt, Ed ? aPV(Kt, Ed >
 V(aKt, I ), which implies
 (A6) V(aKt, Et) = al'V(Kt, Et).
 Because equation (A6) holds for any posi-
 tive Kt and any positive a, the value of the
 firm is proportional to the capital stock to
 the power p, and hence the value function
 can be written as
 (A7) V( Kt, Et) )A( Et) KP -
 Partially differentiating (A7) with respect to
 Kt yields
 V( Kt, -c)
 qt VK (Kt, Et ) _p V(Kt,s
 Kt
 APPENDIX B
 The Value Function When the
 Augmented Adjustment-Cost Function
 Does Not Depend on the Capital Stock
 The optimal program of the firm is gov-
 erned by the differential equation given in
 the text equation (6). Here we assume that
 cK(I, K) 0, so we write the augmented
 adjustment-cost function, c(I, K) as simply
 c(I).
 (Bl) rV(K, e)
 = max { 7r(K, ?) - vc(I) + q(I - AK)
 I,vi
 + ,U(E)V + -
 Now suppose that the firm is a price-taker
 in output and factor markets and has a
 production function that is linearly homoge-
 neous in I and K so that w,(K, e) = HWK
 (see footnote 15). We will verify that
 V(K, ) = q(E)K + JE) satisfies (Bi). Sub-
 stituting V(K, e) = q(E)K + J(E) and
 w,(K, e) = HGW)K into (Bi) and recalling the
 definition of q yields
 (B2) rq(E)K + rJ(E)
 = max{H(E)K - vc(I)
 I,'v
 + q(E)(I - AK) + p(e)q6K + j(e)J6?
 + IO(E)2 q K+ 2ff(E)2j'}j-
 Coll cting terms in K yields
 (B3) [(r+ 8)q(E) -A(E)q6 -( -) q?- H(E)]K
 = max[q(e)I - vc(I)]
 1,jv
 - rJ(E) + gE)J6 + 2f(E)2j??
 In order for (B3) to hold for all K, the
 term in square brackets on the left-hand
 side must equal zero, and the right-hand
 side of (B3) must also equal zero. Note that
 from equation (8) we can write
 (B4) max [ q(E) I - vc(I)] = max[O, +i(q)].
 I, V
 Setting the right-hand side and the left-hand
 side of (B3) equal to zero yields
 (B5) max[O,q((q(E))] - rJ(E) + L(E))JE
 + 2(T 2 E
 and
 (B6) H(E)-(r + )q(E) +1 (E)q_E
 + 2(T(6 2qE =?
 Note that both differential equations are of
 the form
 (B7) g(E) - aX(E) + E(dX/dt) = 0.
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 According to Lemma 1, a solution to the
 differential equation in (B7) is
 00
 (B8) X(--t) = Et| g(_-t+,e-"sds.
 Since equations (B5) and (B6) are both of
 the form in equation (B7), we substitute
 from these into equation (B8) to conclude:
 (B9) J(Et) = Et max[O, q(qt+ )]ersds
 00
 (B10) q(--t) = E, H(Et+s)e-(r+S)s ds.
 Therefore, 1(e) can be interpreted as the
 present value of rents accruing to the firm
 from the augmented adjustment technology,
 and q(et) is the present value of marginal
 products of capital. Note that this solution
 was derived for any diffusion process gov-
 erning Et.
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